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Abstract 
In this article we examine the role of Entscheider (decision-makers) in the German asylum procedure, 
both legally and ethical. As the responsibility for deciding on asylum applications lies exclusively with 
them, their significance for the German asylum procedure can hardly be underestimated. However, 
over the last few decades the situation of Entscheider changed significantly: While the number and 
complexity of the cases they have to decide on has increased due to the growing immigration, the 
requirements for their education have been lowered, owed to critical amendments to the relevant law. 
We analyze how the law currently defines the role of Entscheider, whether the legal framework is 
constitutional, and what modifications morality requires. Although the law defining their role seems 
to be constitutional, Entscheider’s education must be improved and they must be entrusted with the 
hearing of the applicants to meet what morality requires, we conclude. 
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The German asylum procedure is centred on the decision of Entscheider (decision-
makers), as they exclusively decide on asylum applications. Hence, the decisions of a 
single Entscheider significantly influence the lives of hundreds of asylum seekers. 
Despite their central role in the asylum procedure, research has so far paid remarkably 
little attention to them. What may look astonishing at first glance, is rather 
unsurprising regarding the difficulties that we encountered as soon as we started 
working on this topic. 
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When we designed our research project, we asked the BAMF (Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees) for permission and cooperation for a survey on BAMF 
Entscheider in order to additionally answer the empirical question on how they 
themselves understand their role in the asylum procedure. We were quite optimistic, 
as the chairwoman of the Scientific Advisory Board of the BAMF supported us greatly 
and even the head of the BAMF appeared to be curious about our project. Then came 
spring 2018, a series of press releases about meddled asylum applications, which 
amounted to a profound crisis, and – after weeks of waiting – the BAMF preferred 
not to cooperate with us.  
Therefore, our analysis consists of two parts now. First, we outline the role the 
German administrative law assigns to Entscheider in the asylum procedure and critically 
analyze whether the current design meets legal and especially constitutional 
requirements. Second, we provide an ethical analysis of the relevant legal framework, 
concentrating on the three most debatable characteristics of the role of Entscheider. 
Although we are forced to leave the empirical question aside, we want to emphasize 
its general importance. 
The Role of Entscheider in the Asylum Procedure de lege lata 
The legal analysis we would like to start by giving a short overview of the quite 
remarkable historical development of Entscheider’s role in the German asylum 
application system. 
Historical Development 
The first Aliens Act, enacted in 1965, stated that the decision on asylum applications 
had to be taken by a committee consisting of two assessors and a chairman who had 
to be qualified to hold judicial office (§ 30 AuslG). Decisions on intra-administrative 
objections (Widersprüche) against the committee’s decisions were taken by another 
committee of a similar composition. The assessors were appointed equally by the 
Federal Minister of the Interior and the Federal Council (Bundesrat, i.e. the second 
chamber of the German Parliament). Both committees were unbound by directions 
and instructions.2 
In 1982, the AsylVfG (later: AsylG) abolished the committees and replaced 
them with single and independent Entscheider (Einzelentscheider). 
                                                          
2 Marxen 1967, § 30. 
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With the enactment of the Immigration Act on January 1, 2005, legislation was 
altered to the effect that Entscheider are now subject to directives. This means that 
specific instructions regarding individual procedures are now permissible. BAMF 
Entscheider no longer have a special position compared to other federal officials. The 
main objectives pursued by this change in legislation as laid out in the explanatory 
statement of the law are to maintain the uniformity of the legal system, relieve 
pressure on the administrative courts, as well as accelerate the asylum procedure. The 
earlier design was considered “impracticable and retarding the asylum process”.3 
Unity of Entscheider and Hearer 
Up to date, neither in the Asylum Act, the Asylum Procedures Directive nor by the 
administrative courts has it been recognized that hearing the applicant and deciding 
on her application should be conducted by the same person.4 Hearing the applicant 
has never been one of the original tasks of Entscheider, but it can be entrusted to them.5  
For a long time, it was deemed normal that Entscheider who would finally decide on 
the asylum application had also heard the applicant. However, the BAMF deviated 
from this rule, as this was deemed necessary in the past decades. In the course of the 
so-called refugee crisis in 2015, the BAMF set up so-called “decision centres”, where 
cases already heard were being decided by a central pool of Entscheider, so that hearing 
and deciding are now regularly conducted by different officials.6 
Qualification and Training of Entscheider 
The demands on the qualification and training of Entscheider have drastically decreased 
over the decades.7 Whereas earlier legislation (§ 30 I 3 AuslG) provided for the 
chairman of the recognition committee to be qualified for judicial office (i.e. two legal 
state examinations), the individual Entscheider who replaced the committee was only 
required to have the qualification of the higher intermediate-level civil service (§ 4 III 
2 AsylVerfG 1982). Another change of legislation (§ 5 AsylVfG, replacing § 4 
AsylVerfG) then allowed that civil servants of the middle-level civil service may also 
be appointed as Entscheider, if permitted by statutory ordinance (Rechtsverordnung). 
                                                          
3 BT-Drs. 15/420, 106. 
4 BVerwG, Beschl.v. 13.5.1996 – BVerwG 9 B 174/96, Rn. 6 (Jurion); VG Frankfurt (Oder), Beschl. 
V. 23.3 2000 – Az. 4 L 167/00.A, Rn. 8 (juris). 
5 Bergmann 2018, § 5 AsylG Rn. 17; BVerwG, B.v. 13.5.1996; VGH München Beschl. v. 8.8.2017 – 
9 ZB 17.30, BeckRS 2017, 123005. 
6 VGH Mannheim, VBlBW 2017, 424; BT-Drs. 18/9415, 67. 
7 Bergmann 2018, § 5 AsylG Rn. 18. 
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In the course of the so-called refugee crisis, the training of newly hired staff was 
shortened once again so that it lasted three weeks for hearers, four for Entscheider and 
five weeks for Vollentscheider – Entscheider who can also conduct a hearing.8 Since July 
31, 2016, the hearing may also be conducted by a trained employee of another 
administrative authority that carries out tasks under the AsylG and the AufenthG.9 
Constitutionality of the Legislation 
In a nutshell, Entscheider today are subject to directions and instructions, decide single-
handedly instead of in a panel, and rarely conduct the hearing themselves that they 
base their decisions on. This structure and thus the role of Entscheider must be 
measured against sub-constitutional administrative law as well as constitutional law, 
such as the fundamental right to asylum, Article 16a GG, and the principle of the rule 
of law, Article 20 III GG, as well as against the EU directive on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection (2013/32/EU). 
Training and Qualification 
In a ruling on airport asylum proceedings (Flughafenverfahren) in 1996, the Federal 
Constitutional Court found, without any discernible differentiation between hearers 
and Entscheider, that detailed training and ongoing further training were required, but 
accepted the existence of these conditions as given without further examination.10 
Besides, the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) only requires “adequate 
knowledge in questions of international protection” and the “necessary training” of 
Entscheider (recital 16) and makes (little) more detailed provisions on the qualification 
of hearers (Art. 15 para. 3 lit. a). However, the Directive calls for the persons involved 
in the decision to be in a position “to carry out their activities with due respect for 
the principles of professional ethics in force” (recital 17). Whether a few weeks of 
training suffices to meet these requirements, is doubtful.11 
Independence or Ligation of Instructions and Directions 
The independence of instructions and directions used to include decision-making in 
its entirety. It served to keep decisions free of political influence, and thus to ensure 
that Entscheider were solely guided by Article 16a GG and to avoid foreign policy 
                                                          
8 BT-Drs. 18/9415, 65. 
9 Göbel-Zimmermann/Eichhorn/Beichel-Benedetti 2018, Rn. 474. 
10 BVerfG, NVwZ 1996, 678, 682. 
11 Göbel-Zimmermann/Eichhorn/Beichel-Benedetti 2018, Rn. 478. 
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difficulties.12 It included the examination of the formal and material legality as well as 
the question whether all facts had been adequately ascertained. Instructions regarding 
individual procedures, but also general directions, e.g. regarding the prosecution of 
certain population groups in certain countries, were therefore not permitted. In this 
respect, the independence from instructions was partly comparable with the factual 
independence (sachliche Unabhängigkeit) of judges. Some instructions, e.g. such given to 
Entscheider in their function as hearer or on the order in which the processing of 
applications is carried out, were nevertheless permissible.13 
Independence of directions and instructions, though, are very unusual in the 
German administrative law system. The German democratic principle, as laid out in 
Art. 20 II 1 GG, requires an uninterrupted chain of legitimacy (demokratischer 
Legitimationszusammenhang) from every act of the administration to the will of the 
people. This can only be guaranteed if every act of the administration can be traced 
back to the respective state minister as the supreme administrative authority, in this 
case, the Federal Minister of the Interior, who is chosen by the chancellor, 
accountable to the state parliament and thereby democratically legitimized.14 The 
minister can execute her authority by issuing orders for internal application of 
concrete or individual nature (known as instructions – Weisungen) or of abstract or 
general nature (administrative directions – Verwaltungsvorschriften).15 Therefore, federal 
officials have a duty to obey (Gehorsamspflicht, as stated in § 62 I 2 BBG). Exceptions 
to this rule are possible if stated by a special law and constitutionally justified. Such 
exceptions exist e.g. for the Federal Accounting Office (Bundesrechnungshof, § 3 IV 
BRehG, Art. 114 GG) and for university professors as far as their teaching and 
research are concerned. 
Hence, the question is whether such an exception could also be justified in the 
case of Entscheider. In view of Article 16a GG, which enjoys a particularly important 
position due to its close connection to the fundamental right of human dignity (Article 
1 GG), and the peculiarities of the determination of the facts in the asylum 
procedure,16 it does not appear to be entirely excluded. Another question, however, 
is whether independence from instructions is constitutionally required. This is 
indisputably not the case, since there is no infringement of Article 16a GG by making 
                                                          
12 Bergmann 2018, § 5 AsylG Rn. 19. 
13 Bergmann 2018, § 5 AsylG Rn. 19. 
14 Grigoleit 2017, § 62 Rn. 3. 
15 Grigoleit 2017, § 62 Rn. 4. 
16 Marx 2012. 
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Entscheider subject to instructions and directions and no violation of other 
constitutional goods comes into consideration. The design of the Entscheider’s role as 
independent or bound by instructions is thus entirely the responsibility of the 
legislative authority. 
Unity of Hearer and Entscheider 
The administrative courts and legal literature agree that it is advantageous for the 
decision on the asylum application if the Entscheider also hears the applicant and is 
thus able to gain a personal impression.17 However, the mere advantageousness of a 
legal structure is not decisive for its legal or constitutional conformity. If the 
applicant's submission is believed and the application is rejected for reasons other 
than lack of credibility, for example, because the reasons put forward are not enough 
to substantiate the application, the separation of Entscheider and hearer does not make 
any significant legal difference. Thus, the separation of hearer and Entscheider in 
principle does not violate the duty of official investigation (Amtsermittlungsgrundsatz, § 
23 VwVfG).18 The decision on the unity or separation of hearer and Entscheider is 
therefore incumbent upon the head of the BAMF, and thus ultimately on the Federal 
Minister of the Interior (Art. 65 GG) who has discretion over the design of the 
procedure of hearings, as it is not regulated by law. 
The situation is different if the application is rejected due to a lack of 
credibility.19 The assessment of credibility is a subjective decision, even if it is linked 
to certain legally established standards.20 If there are doubts about credibility, it must 
be ensured that the Entscheider can obtain a personal impression of the applicant. If 
this is not the case, this constitutes a violation of the duty of official investigation      
(§§ 24 VwVfG, 24 AsylG), which constitutes a concretization of the constitutional 
principle of the legality of the administration (Grundsatz der Gesetzmäßigkeit der 
Verwaltung, Art. 20 III GG).21 
It seems questionable whether without legal regulation it is ensured that in 
individual cases hearings and decisions fall to the same person, despite the systematic 
separation of hearers and Entscheider. This is unlikely because the credibility of a 
                                                          
17 Göbel-Zimmermann/Eichhorn/Beichel-Benedetti 2018, Rn. 12-19; BVerwG, B.v. 13.5.1996; 
VGH Mannheim, VBlBW 2017, 424. 
18 BVerwG, Beschl.v. 13.5.1996, Rn. 6. 
19 BVerwG, Beschl.v. 13.5.1996; VGH Mannheim, VBlBW 2017, 424; BT-Drs. 18/9415, 67. 
20 Gies 2017, 410. 
21 Schwarz 2016, § 24 VwVfG Rn. 4. 
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statement cannot be assessed before the hearing itself; once the hearing has been 
conducted by a staff member qualified only to conduct hearings, the entire hearing 
would have to be repeated by a different staff member. However, since the separation 
of hearer and Entscheider was introduced precisely to speed up proceedings,22 such a 
time-consuming correction of the procedural error mentioned above does not appear 
to be guaranteed in all cases. Although the legislator has a broad discretion to enact 
laws, there is a limit when the lack of legal regulation violates the prohibition of 
insufficient legislation (Untermaßverbot). This would be the case if the legislator did not 
enact a law that suffices to protect the fundamental right to asylum or to ensure 
judicial protection, which is generally very limited in asylum procedure law. It seems 
highly questionable whether the complete absence of a legal regulation to ensure the 
principle of official investigation in cases of dubious credibility can satisfy the 
prohibition of insufficient legislation. 
What Should Be the Role of Entscheider in the Asylum 
Procedure? 
It is not a trivial truth that law is not necessarily moral just because it is law. Therefore, 
an action might be perfectly legal and yet illegitimate. It is a kind of fallacy we have to 
keep in mind, since what is true for each and every law is also true for the German 
law defining the role of Entscheider in the asylum procedure.23 So, the question is: What 
– from a moral point of view – should be the role of Entscheider in the asylum 
procedure? 
There are two possible ways to answering that question: starting from scratch 
or taking the status quo into consideration. Both ways embody two different 
metaethical approaches. Let us call the first the idealistic approach and the second the 
pragmatic approach of ethical analysis. In the following, we pursue the pragmatic 
approach because we can assume that, although an idealistic approach may give a 
good answer to our question, the implementation of this answer would cost more 
resources and is therefore less likely to be implemented than the answer the pragmatic 
approach provides. It is a common mistake made by philosophers to aim for the best 
possible solution in ethics without thoroughly looking at its feasibility. In all the 
possible solutions we strive for the most feasible with the best moral consequences. 
                                                          
22 BT-Drs. 18/9415, 67. 
23 In his current introduction to administrative ethics, Benjamin Lindner (2017, 48) affirms the 
importance of the distinction between the terms of legality and legitimacy for administrative ethics 
in general. 
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By emphasizing the consequences, we have already revealed the basic ethical 
assumption which makes our approach consequentialist. But to define what the “best 
consequences” are, we have to reveal some more of our basic assumptions upon 
which we build our ethical analysis. We assume that the purpose of morality is at least 
to diminish suffering caused by human actions. As everyone who is affected by an 
action may be the subject to suffering caused by this action, anyone who is affected 
must be considered. This means for us not only to regard Entscheider, but also the 
asylum seekers and the German state.24 
Having clarified our approach and our basic assumptions, we try to answer what 
should the role of Entscheider in the asylum procedure be. As we have pointed out 
their current role has mainly three debatable characteristics: First Entscheider are bound 
by instructions and directions, second, they decide single-handedly and, third, not 
necessarily based on hearings they conducted themselves. We will discuss all three 
characteristics to analyse their role in the asylum procedure. 
Should Entscheider Be Subject to Instructions and Directions? 
The answer to this question first and foremost depends on whether we assume the 
current government should be allowed to influence the individual asylum procedures, 
as that is the purpose of instructions and directions. If one argues for Entscheider being 
instructed or directed, one accepts the influence of the government. If one argues 
against them being bound, one denies the government to exert influence on asylum 
procedures. 
The best argument to put forward against the influence of the government 
seems to be the ill intentions a government could have and their consequences. The 
damage that could be caused by such bad influence of the government on the asylum 
procedure would, in the worst case, be life-threatening for the asylum seekers if the 
result were their legally or morally unjustified deportation. The argument is built upon 
the assumption that this damage needs to be prevented. However, the only possibility 
to avoid such damage appears to deny the government any influence on the asylum 
procedures. In consequence, it appears that Entscheider should not be subject to 
instructions and directions. 
The argument is conclusive, but weaker than it seems. What would it mean for 
the influence of the government to be “bad”? The argument is primarily convincing 
                                                          
24 With this assumption we are pursuing a more comprehensive approach to an ethics of Entscheider 
than Tobias Trappe (2015, 47), whose “ethics of asylum administration” is probably the only 
approach to such an ethics so far. 
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because it does not answer this question. Apparently, there are as many answers as 
there are migration policies. Even representatives of incompatible migration policies 
could agree on the argument. Moreover, the argument suggests that the influence of 
the government on asylum procedures could assume undesirable effects of alarming 
proportions. However, this suggestion lacks reason. The government is in its 
instructions and directions bound to the German constitution (Art. 1 III, 20 III GG) 
and every asylum procedure is contestable before an administrative court if it was 
violating constitutional or only sub-constitutional law. As no administrative judge is 
bound by any instruction or direction (Art. 97 I GG, § 1 GVG), all legally and 
probably most immoral consequences of the governmental influence on Entscheider 
would be revised by the court hearing. 
We do not deny the possibility of immoral consequences due to the influence 
of the government. However, its instructions and directions could also lead to moral 
consequences. More precisely, they might offer the only possibility to compensate for 
the inadequate training of Entscheider by scaling down the leeway in their decision-
making. This compensation could be of advantage for all three subjects we would like 
to regard in our analysis: for the asylum seekers (as the probability of legal and 
legitimate decisions on their application may rise), for Entscheider (since the 
instructions and directions at least partially release them from their moral 
responsibility for the applicants)25 and for the state (because the higher probability of 
legal decisions implicates a lower probability of cost-intensive corrections by 
administrative courts). Therefore, it seems to be – especially within the pragmatic 
approach – morally demanded to obligate Entscheider to follow the instructions and 
directions of the government – at least for the moment. 
Should Entscheider Decide Single-handedly? 
As with the first question, we should disclose the assumption that is crucial to 
answering our second question concerning the role of Entscheider in the asylum 
procedure, namely whether they should decide alone. This assumption seems to be 
that Entscheider can at least make a legal decision on asylum applications.26 If one leaves 
Entscheider to decide single-handedly, they should be able to make those decisions at 
                                                          
25 In particular, this can provide moral relief for Entscheider who are aware that their training is hardly 
sufficient to fulfil their moral responsibility towards the applicants. 
26 Of course, it also would be right to state that the negation of this very assumption (i.e. “Entscheider 
cannot even make legal decisions on asylum applications.”) is decisive for answering the second 
question. In fact, the answers to all three questions concerning the role of Entscheider are always 
determined by a particular assumption or its negation. 
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least within the legal framework. Otherwise, we assume it is morally untenable to leave 
those decision to a single Entscheider. 
The fact that there is a high number of cases overturned by the administrative 
courts may counter this assumption: In 2017 almost 40% of the decisions challenged 
before administrative courts were overruled by the judges.27 This points to Entscheider 
not being able to reliably decide on the applications while abiding by the law. As long 
as this situation is not changed by providing them with better training, they therefore 
should not make those decisions. In consequence, though, this would call for 
Entscheider to be again part of a panel, which would decide on the asylum applications. 
But this alternative is not much better. If the decision was made by a panel of 
Entscheider, the decision is not necessarily legal or legitimate. The assumption that 
Entscheider can compensate for each other´s weaknesses is not evident.28 Instead, 
forming panels entails the risk of group pressure.29 In order to conform to the 
majority of the panel, some Entscheider might knowingly support illegal or illegitimate 
decisions on asylum applications. Even if we leave these objections aside, it has to be 
pointed to the significantly higher resource expenses for panels of Entscheider 
compared to sole Entscheider, especially concerning the expenditure of time. What does 
it mean for an asylum seeker if she has to wait for months for a decision on her asylum 
application? How many more resources does it take for the state to integrate someone 
after such a long period of waiting time for a positive decision? Ultimately, there is a 
threat of wasting private and state resources, that is hard to be morally legitimized. 
Therefore, within the pragmatic approach, it seems the best alternative to let 
Entscheider decide on their own and to sufficiently train them, so they are able to make 
legal and legitimate decisions. If they are not sufficiently trained, they should not be 
replaced by better-trained Entscheider – even if there were actually well-trained 
Entscheider to supplant them. The change in personnel would delay the asylum 
procedures of many asylum seekers, cost the state additional resources and force 
current Entscheider into unemployment. Instead, their lack of competence should be 
compensated by further training. The ethics of migration and administration should 
contribute to the concrete design of this education and training if it is not to lose 
contact with the real world. 
                                                          
27 Anzlinger/Auel 02.08.2018. 
28 We are grateful to David Miller for pointing out that even taking into account the Condorcet-Jury-
Theorem, a panel of Entscheider would only make the decision significantly more likely legal or 
legitimate if the number of Entscheider in the panel were very high. 
29 For the influence of group pressure, see the by now classical experiment of Ash (1951). 
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Should Entscheider Also Conduct the Hearing? 
How to answer this third question basically depends on whether one assumes that 
Entscheider can make legal and legitimate decisions on asylum applications without 
having heard the applicants themselves. If this assumption is false, it seems morally 
imperative that the Entscheider hear the applicants in the asylum procedure. If, 
however, one shares the assumption that Entscheider can make legal and legitimate 
decisions without having heard the asylum seeker, one allows the personal separation 
of hearing and decision in the asylum procedure. 
We have argued for Entscheider to decide single-handedly for the procedure being 
more efficient. An adaption of this efficiency-argument also seems to be the strongest 
for the separation of Entscheider and hearer. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
former president of BAMF, Jutta Cordt, put forward the same argument to justify the 
separation of hearing and decision.30 The argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
If Entscheider are specialized in deciding on asylum applications and hearers are 
specialized in hearing the asylum seekers, the division of labour seems to let them 
work more efficiently. The smaller variance in operational procedures would raise the 
pace of work and division of labor could even lessen the influence of cognitive 
biases.31 
But it is exactly the division between the one deciding the asylum application 
and the one hearing the asylum seeker which provokes further distortions. By this 
division the testimony of the asylum seeker is not only being distorted by the cognitive 
biases of Entscheider but also by the ones of the hearer. Let us not forget, that usually 
none of the two is able to speak the language of the asylum seeker, throwing a third 
person – the interpreter – into the mix, leaving a threefold distorted testimony. As 
the testimony is the foundation for the decision of Entscheider, the risk of a threefold 
distortion is morally untenable and altogether not efficiency-raising, these distortions 
increase the risk of not only morally but also legally wrong decisions, which probably 
take more time to be corrected than to be prevented. For this reason alone, the 
consequences of the separation of hearing and decision on asylum applications are 
neither in the interest of the applicants, nor the state nor Entscheider – assuming that 
they themselves strive for legal and legitimate decisions. 
However, there is a second reason. The division of Entscheider and hearers 
implicates a division of moral responsibility for the decision on the asylum applicants. 
                                                          
30 Haerder 28.02.2017. 
31 Trappe (2015, 48) has already stressed the influence of the cognitive bias of Entscheider on their 
asylum decisions as a problem and thus a topic of administrative ethics. 
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This division poses a risk leaving Entscheider only with an indirect responsibility for 
those whose applications they decide on. If they do not hear the applicants, they 
decide solely based on a report on the testimony of the applicants, which they are not 
responsible for. Of course, it is not impossible to determine the respective 
responsibility of the Entscheider and the hearer in a decision. But the division of 
responsibility evidently makes this determination more difficult. This problem, which 
Dennis Thompson called the “problem of many hands”,32 is not a particular problem 
of asylum administration. But in the asylum administration it can be particularly 
dangerous, as Entscheider are responsible for people in particular need of protection. 
If they do not take sufficient account of this responsibility, their decisions can be life-
threatening for the applicants in the short term. However, the division of labor allows 
Entscheider to distance themselves from their responsibility for the applicants33 – even 
more than if they heard the asylum seekers themselves.34 Therefore it seems 
appropriate for Entscheider to hear in person the testimony of the asylum seekers on 
whose applications they decide. 
In summary, Entscheider should be bound by instructions and directions, decide 
single-handedly and on the basis of their own hearings. We are well aware that this 
answer only takes into account the three most debatable characteristics of the role of 
Entscheider in the asylum procedure and is therefore just a start. It will be the task of 
an ethics of migration and administration, which takes greater account of Entscheider, 
to proceed and define their role in more detail. 
Conclusion 
As we have shown, the current legislation on the role of Entscheider in the German 
asylum procedure is constitutional and morally justifiable in many aspects. The 
systematic separation of hearing the applicant and deciding on her application, 
however, is not acceptable from a moral point of view. It is therefore gratifying that 
BAMF is beginning to entrust the Entscheider with the hearing of the applicants again.35 
Even though laws are not necessarily based on moral considerations, the 
importance of this specific area of administrative law on the life of human beings 
                                                          
32 Thompson 1980, 905. 
33 Trappe (2013, 254) also points to the problem of the many hands in asylum administration. Unlike 
us, however, Trappe sees the greatest danger in the loss of human dignity of Entscheider 
34 Schneider and Wottrich (2017, 106) indicate that Entscheider – due to the limited contact – can 
distance themselves from their responsibility for their decisions on the asylum applications even if 
they hear the applicants themselves. 
35 www.bamf.de. 
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demands high standards of not only legal but also moral justification – a necessity that 
European lawmakers have already recognized in recital 17 of the Directive on Asylum 
Procedures. But although they have recognized the necessity of a professional ethics 
of Entscheider they did not elaborate on this. It seems that at this juncture ethicists are 
in demand to help filling in the gap. Since the gap is one in European law, filling it is 
neither only a German interest nor only a task of German ethicists and lawyers. 
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